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1An autonomous social robot in fear
Álvaro Castro-González, María Malfaz, Miguel A. Salichs
Abstract—Currently artificial emotions are being extensively
used in robots. Most of these implementations are employed to
display affective states. Nevertheless, their use to drive the robot’s
behavior is not so common. This is the approach followed by the
authors in this work. In this research, emotions are not treated in
general but individually. Several emotions have been implemented
in a real robot, but in this paper, authors focus on the use of the
emotion of fear as an adaptive mechanism to avoid dangerous
situations. In fact, fear is used as a motivation which guides the
behavior during specific circumstances.
Appraisal of fear is one of the cornerstones of this work. A
novel mechanism learns to identify the harmful circumstances
which cause damage to the robot. Hence, these circumstances
elicit the fear emotion and are known as fear releasers.
In order to prove the advantages of considering fear in
our decision making system, the robot’s performance with and
without fear are compared and the behaviors are analyzed.
The robot’s behaviors exhibited in relation to fear are natural,
i.e. the same kind of behaviors can be observed on animals.
Moreover, they have not been preprogrammed, but learned by
real interactions in the real world.
All these ideas have been implemented in a real robot living
in a laboratory and interacting with several items and people.
Index Terms—fear, emotions, decision making, social robot,
autonomy.
I. INTRODUCTION
DUE to the recent interest on robotic applications for mak-ing easier our daily life, one of the most popular current
research areas in robotics is Social Robotics. According to
[1], a social robot can be defined as: “An autonomous or
semi-autonomous robot that interacts and communicates with
humans by following the behavioral norms expected by the
people with whom the robot is intended to interact”. Therefore,
it is expected that these robots have some kind of “social
intelligence” which helps them to behave in an appropriate
way. This kind of intelligence is related to emotions [2], so, an
emotion-based control architecture seems to be an important
element for socially intelligent robots [3].
The role of emotions in robotics has been extensively
defended by many researchers [4][5][6][7][8] [9][3][10]. Most
of them think that since emotions in humans and animals are
essential for survival, autonomy, learning, decision-making,
social interactions, etc., then, they are necessary for robots
which are intended to live among us.
Nevertheless, according to Ziemke and Lowe [11], the main
question is not if the robots need emotions, but if the human
designers and users of robots need or want robots to have or
at least express emotions. In fact, they stated that from an
engineering perspective, the question rather is: Does building
models of emotional/affective mechanisms into our robots
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make them more natural, more useful, or more efficient? This
question is very important, and in fact, some authors, such
as Cañamero in [12] and Scheutz in [10], share the idea that
emotions per se does not make robots more intelligent, but we
must be able to prove how emotions improve somehow our
robot’s performance. In those referred works, both authors
propose a method to evaluate the usefulness of emotions
in robots, that is, to compare their performance during the
execution of the same task, with and without emotions.
The work presented in this paper is a continuation of
previous research which is focused on autonomous and so-
cial robots. In previous works, authors have already applied
emotions on virtual agents [13]. Moreover, they have presented
the decision making system of the social robot Maggie [14]
[15] which is based on drives, motivations, and emotions. This
robot learns, using reinforcement learning, the right action
to select in order to maintain an internal equilibrium. The
implemented emotions are happiness, sadness, and fear.
The first two emotions, happiness and sadness, have been
already studied in the cited works. The work presented in
this paper is centered on the use of fear and its application to
robots.
The role of emotions in this system, as in [11], is focused on
the behavioral organization of individual agents, rather than on
their expression and recognition involved in social interactions.
According to Arbib and Fellous [16], both approaches are
referred as the “internal” and “external” aspects of emotions
respectively. Others consider these aspects as emotional expe-
rience and emotional expression respectively [17].
Many psychologists nowadays agree that emotion is the
result of an evaluation (appraisal) of the current situation [18]
[19]. Moreover, the appraisal theory says that each emotion
is elicited by a distinctive pattern of appraisal. Based on this
idea, each emotion is treated by separate, that is, each of them
has different appraisal mechanisms that release them.
In addition, each emotion has different roles. As already
said, in this work, the emotions implemented in the decision
making system of the robot are happiness, sadness, and
fear. In previous works, [14] [15] [13], is explained that
happiness and sadness are generated from the evaluation
of the wellbeing of the robot, and they are used as the
reinforcement function in the learning process.
This paper is focused on the emotion of fear, its generation,
its role in the decision making process of the robot, and its
influence on the robot’s performance.
In relation to its generation, it has been already stated that
emotion is the result of an appraisal of the current situation.
In the case of fear, as shown in the next section, this appraisal
consists mainly on detecting a dangerous situation (emotional
releaser). In nature, some of these emotional releasers are
innate, or natural releasers, but others are learned by the
2individual through its own experience. In this paper authors
present an appraisal mechanism which allows the robot to
learn to release fear in front of a new emerging dangerous
situation, even if this event was not identified by the designer
in advance.
On the other hand, the role of fear in humans and animals
is basically to motivate the right behaviors to avoid those
dangerous situations. Fear is used as an adaptive mechanism
intended to prevent our robot of being harmed. This is, in fact,
the unique role of fear according to Breazeal and Brooks [20].
Although in [21] is said that the fear responses (freezing or
escape responses) are not learned and they are innate, in our
approach, the robot does not have any predefined behavior.
Thanks to the proposed decision making system and learning
algorithms, the emotional behaviors are also learned by the
robot and compared with the one expected from a living-being
in order to show the validity of our approach.
At the end of the paper we evaluate, following the
proposal of Cañamero and Scheutz, the performance of
the robot using the emotion of fear in the decision making
process. In order to do that, the robot lives in a real envi-
ronment where dangerous situations arise. Those results are
compared with the ones obtained in the same environment
and conditions, but without the fear emotion. One of the
main goals of this experiment is to study how the robot decides
that a certain situation is dangerous (appraisal of fear).
The approach to fear presented in this paper is related to
exogenous actions. These actions are not executed by the
robot but by other objects causing asynchronous changes,
which affect the robot. Harmful exogenous actions are the
cornerstone to identify the dangerous situations.
When the exogenous actions executed in a state are always
advantageous, the expected utility of this situation is high. If,
from time to time, an exogenous action in a state is harmful
to the robot, the expected utility of the state is still high. This
is because, on average, the outcome is high. Both expected
utilities are high, however, in the latter case, the situation
is considered risky because an exogenous action could cause
damage to the robot. By means of fear, these risky states are
detected, and the right reactions are generated. The method
proposed in this paper presents an approach to deal with these
risky or dangerous situations.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a
brief review about the appraisal theory of emotions. Next, a
review of some works related to this research topic is given in
Section III. Then, Section IV exposes general ideas about the
fear emotion and defines the scope of this work. In Section
V, a general description of the robotic platform (hardware
and software) is explained. Later, Section VI, presents a
summary of the decision making system of the robot. Next,
all parameters are configured to define the desired robot’s
personality for testing fear (Section VII). Section VIII details
the novel mechanism intended to appraise dangerous situations
(appraisal of fear). The next section, Section IX, presents
the results of the experiments made in order to prove the
usefulness of the fear emotion. Coming, some reflections about
the observed results are expressed in Section X. Finally, the
main conclusions of this paper are summarized in Section XI.
II. THE APPRAISAL THEORY
The appraisal theory is the claim that emotions are elicited
by evaluations of situations [19]. According to this theory, it
is the interpretations of situations, rather than the situations
themselves, that cause emotions. Because appraisals intervene
between situations and emotions, different individuals who
appraise the same situation in significantly different ways will
experience different emotions; and even a given individual who
appraises the same situation in significantly different ways at
different times will have different emotions. A good example
would be a football match, the same situation (the result of
the game) will produce different emotions depending on your
team [8]. Another example can be observed on a student doing
an exam: if he has studied hard all the semester, in general, he
feels confident and relaxed; in contrast, if he has not studied
enough, he experiences fear and gets nervous.
Following this theory, a situation cannot be tagged with an
emotional value in advance, it is the interpretation each person
makes of that situation which gives that individual evaluation.
In order to understand the appraisal mechanisms of emo-
tions, that is, how they emerge in our brain, authors propose,
as LeDoux in [22], that emotions must be studied one by
one. According to him, the different emotions are produced
by different brain networks. In fact, in [23] it is also explained
how other theorists, inspired by the prototypical work of
Darwin, have proposed that a small set of discrete emotions are
underpinned by relatively separable neural system in the brain
[24] [25]. Currently, it seems that different emotions involve
different brain circuits, despite of same brain areas could be
common.
Therefore, as stated in Section I, based on these ideas,
emotions are studied separately, and more specifically, in this
work we have focused our research on just one emotion: fear.
LeDoux [22] states that the function of this emotion is to
detect danger and to produce reactions which increase the
probabilities of survival in a dangerous situation. In other
words, it is a defense mechanism. Therefore, the appraisal
mechanism of fear is related to the evaluation of a situation
as dangerous.
According to Rosis [26], there is a systematic confusion
between two kinds of “evaluation”:
• Appraisal: the automatic, implicit, intuitive orientation
toward what is good and what is bad for the organism.
• Evaluation: the cognitive judgments relative to what is
good or bad for someone (and why).
In fact, LeDoux relates this unconscious appraisal to emo-
tion, and conscious evaluation to feelings [22].
On the other hand, Sloman [27] differentiates between
primary emotions which have a reactive or automatic basis
and secondary emotions that require a deliberative process to
initiate them.
It is important to note that, in the approach presented in this
paper, the appraisal of a dangerous situation will be based on
an automatic process using associative learning. As will be
shown later, the robot, using reinforcement learning, is able
to identify dangerous situations without using any deliberative
mechanism.
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There are many researchers that have implemented emo-
tions, or at least some emotionally inspired mechanisms, in
their artificial systems. Some authors such as Breazeal [6] [20],
Hirth et al [2], and Hollinger et al [28], focus their works on
the external expression of emotions proving how they improve
the human-robot interaction. Others implement emotions in
their control architectures based on motivations in order to
influence their decision making, see the works of Cañamero
[29] [7] [12], Gadanho [4], and Parisi and Petrosino [30].
More specifically, Parsi and Petrosino, and Cañamero pro-
pose that emotions are a submechanism that exists in order to
help the motivational decision mechanism to function more
properly, by for example, modifying the intensity of the
motivations, etc.. On the other hand, Gadanho uses emotions
as reinforcement functions and for interrupting behavioural
processes in order to deal with new and unexpected situations.
Most of the researchers consider emotions as a whole, that
is, they define their role or functionality in their systems as a
unique entity. Many of these researchers defend the position
of views emotions as a limited set of dimensions. This set of
dimensions defines an affective space which is used to appraise
the emotion at each instant. This point of view minimizes the
importance of distinctions among emotions [31].
One of the main differences of those approaches with the
one presented in this paper is that the role of emotions is
not define as a unique entity. On the contrary, it is proposed
that each emotion has a particular role in the decision making
process of the robot. Moreover, each emotion has its own
appraisal process and is not related to a pre-defined event or
situation (releaser event) as those authors do.
The work presented in this paper is implemented on a real
social robot and, instead of studying the three cited emotions,
authors focus on the fear emotion: its role, its appraisal
process, and the learned emotional reactions.
This approach is not common in this research area, in fact,
in relation to the treatment of the emotion fear, there are few
works which study it as an independent emotion.
Herrera and Moffat [32] present an investigation of the
role of fear as the anticipation of harm. According to them,
dangerous is the situation that is appraised as potentially
incompatible with some of our concerns. Nothing is dangerous
per se, but in interaction. In this interaction we appraise this
danger, and that is much dependent on each of us.
In their work, they use a simulated khepera robot in a
prey/predator scenario. The goal is to maintain the robot
around the target avoiding the predator. At first, the robot
must be able to discriminate between the target object and
the predator (to appraise the situation of being next to the
target or next to the predator). In order to do this, they give
valence to each object by observing the average motion of the
robot. When the robot is being chased by the predator, which
should result in a negative value, the average speed is high,
while next to the target (positive value) is low.
Another interesting approach to the appraisal of fear is the
one presented by Velásquez [33]. In his approach he considers
natural (or innate) releasers and also, he included the capacity
of acquiring learned releasers. The natural releasers are for
example, in the case of fear, situations in which the sensory
systems would not work properly (dark environments), and
the detection of archetypal predators. The learnt releasers
correspond to the stimuli that they tend to be associated with
and predictive natural releasers. For example, if a person A is
naturally experiencing fear because of an unpleasant noise and,
concurrently, A observes other person B, then, after several
repetitions of this situation, person A will experience fear when
he perceives person B.
In a later work, [34], Velasquez does not include any pre-
wired cognitive elicitors, but rather allows them to be learned
through emotional experiences, as the agent interacts with
its environment. Actually, as introduced in section I, this is
the same approach followed by the authors in this work: the
releaser situation of the emotion fear (the dangerous situation)
is learned by the robot using a novel mechanism to appraise
that kind of situations.
IV. GENERAL ASPECTS OF FEAR
The present work is focused on the role of fear applied to an
autonomous social robot. This research focuses on the same
kind of fear that can be observed on people who have phobia
about flying: they are terrified when they take a plane (even
before) although the probability of a real plain crash is very
low. Their fear cannot be controlled and their reactions are not
intentional. Once they are on board, this hypothetical crash is
not under their control, so they cannot make any decision to
avoid it.
In general, in this work, two processes related to fear are
covered: how the fear emotion emerges (the appraisal of fear
already introduced in section II) and how it influences the
robot’s behavior (fear reactions).
Dual-process theories distinguish between intuition (fast and
emotional) and reasoning (slow and controlled) as a basis for
human decision-making. Related to the generation of fear, both
approaches correspond with the appraisal and the evaluation of
fear already presented in section II. Furthermore, reactions to
fear can also be automatic or deliberative processes. Then, this
dualistic approach is easily observed in fear. In some cases,
fear is automatically elicited (mice are afraid of cats), but in
others fear emerges due to a reasoning process (e.g. due to
the actual economic circumstances, I am afraid of loosing my
job). Moreover, this deliberative process affecting fear works
as feedback to the intensity of fear (e.g. if I loose my job, I
will not get money, and then I will not be able to feed my
family, and finally we will all die). Besides, some responses
to fear are automatically executed (a mouse runs away from a
cat) but others are consciously carried out (e.g. I have to work
harder or I can be dismissed).
Automatic processes are also referred as reactive processes
by some researchers. Both terms, without distinction, can be
used but authors prefer the automatic term.
Automatic processes, both for appraisal as well as for
reactions, can be observed in animals. These are required for
survival purposes. However, deliberative processes are specific
of humans beings and this is one of our main characteristics.
4The system proposed on this paper focuses on automatic
aspects of fear: fear is automatically appraised once danger-
ous situations are identified; and the responses to fear are
automatically selected because our system just considers the
available information at that instant, there is not a model used
to predict the effects in the future. Then, there is not reasoning
behind our decision making system. The behavior is formed
by selecting the most appropriate actions at each moment.
Therefore, the whole process is an automatic process where
deliberation is not involved.
Another classification of fear is related to the origin of the
processes. Some fears are innate or inherited. This implies
that these fears are more species specific than those acquired
during life by experience. The latests correspond to learned
fears which are considered in this work. Then, the robot learns
both the releasers of fear and the proper reactions. Innate fears
are considered by some researches as instincts which provide
a key survival mechanism. Actually, animals without these
instincts should have difficulties to reach adulthood.
In order to clarify the ideas presented in this section, several
examples are presented in two tables: table I shows examples
about how fear is generated; and table II presents examples
of different reactions to fear. Tables I and II summarize the
classifications of fear considered in this section. Each cell
contains an example considering how the process has been
acquired and how it is performed. Yellow cells correspond
with the kind of fear the authors have implemented in this
work. Red cells are those combinations which are impossible:
something innate has been inherited so it is a species feature; in
contrast, deliberation is a particular process of each individual;
in consequence, deliberative-innate processes are not possible.
TABLE I
EXAMPLES OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF THE GENERATION OF FEAR
How is it acquired?
Innate Learned
How is it
performed?
Appraisal
(automatic)
Mice experience fear when they
perceive the presence of a cat
Cats have fear when they per-
ceive the presence of the veteri-
narian
Evaluation
(deliberative) The global economic crisis
TABLE II
EXAMPLES OF DIFFERENT REACTIONS TO FEAR
How is it acquired?
Innate Learned
How is it
performed?
Automatic Mice escape from cats Cats run away when they see the
veterinarian
Deliberative I must work harder in order tokeep the job position
In this work, fear is related to dangerous states where the
robot can be harmed due to other’s action, i.e. the robot
will be afraid if it is in a situation where other agent can
potentially damage it. Nevertheless, the action performed by
the individual itself can also be harmful (imaging you walk a
tightrope). In this case, these are risky actions and fear also
comes up because of them (e.g. you are afraid of walking a
tightrope). Risky actions have already been studied in virtual
agents [35] and they will be considered in our robot in future
works.
V. EXPERIMENTAL PLATFORM: THE SOCIAL ROBOT
MAGGIE
The present work has been implemented and tested in the
social robot Maggie. This robot and its control architecture
are summarized in this section. For more detailed information,
please refer to [36] [37] [14] [38].
Maggie (Figure 1) is a social and personal robot intended
to perform research on human-robot interaction and to im-
prove autonomy. It was conceived for personal assistance,
entertainment, to help handicapped people, to keep people
accompanied, etc. Its external friendly look facilitates its social
robot task.
Fig. 1. Our social robot Maggie interacting with children
In relation to its hardware, Maggie is a computer-controlled
system with a wheeled base which allows the robot to move
through the environment. Its arms, neck, and eyelids move-
ments provide Maggie with a life-like appearance. The vision
system uses a camera in the head and, thanks to it, Maggie
can recognize people and play several games. The laser
telemeter and the ultrasound sensors are used by the navigation
system to maneuver in the environment. By means of an
infrared emitter/receiver, Maggie also operates different home
appliances such as televisions or music players. Touch sensors
on the surface of the body and a touch screen situated in the
chest are used for a direct interaction with people. Moreover,
two RFID antennas are used for identifying objects. In order
to provide verbal interaction, our robot is equipped with a
text-to-speech module and an automatic speech recognition
system. In addition, verbal interaction is improved by a natural
dialog system which provides Maggie with a natural oral
communication.
Maggie was conceived as a fully autonomous robot that
makes its own decisions. In order to achieve it, Maggie
is controlled by an architecture developed by the authors’
research group: the Automatic-Deliberative (AD) architecture.
It considers two levels, the automatic and the deliberative
levels.
In the AD architecture [39], both levels are formed by
skills, which endow the robot with different sensory and
motor capacities, and process information [40]. These skills
are coordinated by the decision making system.
The proposed decision making system has a bidirectional
communication with the rest of the control architecture. On
5one hand, the decision making system selects the proper action
which satisfies the most urgent need. This action is translated
into a skill (deliberative or automatic one). On the other
hand, the decision making system needs information from the
environment in order to update the state of the robot and to
assess the suitability of the skills activated. This information
is provided by the sensors of the robot.
The proposed decision making system works in an auto-
matic way. Deliberative processes look into the future to assess
the effects of actions made in the present. Our system does
not predict the future, but it considers the current state and
the learned values from past experiences. This means that
our decision making system is not a deliberative process but
an automatic one which considers the knowledge acquired in
previous experiences.
VI. THEORETICAL APPROACH TO OUR DECISION MAKING
SYSTEM
The social and autonomous robot Maggie is endowed with
a decision making system based on drives, motivations, emo-
tions, and self-learning.
This system has been extensively described in previous
works [13] [14] [15]. Nevertheless, we will try to explain
the system and some basic concepts: homeostasis, drives,
and motivations.
Homeostasis means maintaining a stable internal state
[41]. According to the homeostatic approach, the human
behavior is oriented to the maintenance of the internal
equilibrium. The internal state can be parameterized by
several variables, which must be at an ideal level. When
the value of these variables differs from the ideal one, an
error signal occurs: the drive [29]. In this approach, the
drives are considered as the internal needs.
According to Hull [42], the drives increase the general
excitation level of an animal and they are considered as
properties of deficit states which motivate behavior.
The word motivation derives from the Latin word motus
and indicates the dynamic root of behaviour, which means
those internal factors, rather than external ones, that urge
the organism to take action [43]. In other words, the
motivational state is a tendency to correct the error, i.e.,
the drive, through the execution of behaviours.
The aim of the presented decision making system is to
achieve a fully autonomous robot which learns to make
decisions in order to maintain its needs within an acceptable
range (homeostasis). For this purpose, it uses a reinforcement
learning algorithm in order to decide which action is the
most suitable in every state. In this work, the well-known Q-
Learning algorithm [44] is employed, so the Q(s, a) values
must be computed. The proposed reinforcement function is
the variation of the wellbeing of the robot. This variation is
produced by the passing of time and by the effects of the
execution of an action. The wellbeing is defined as a function
of its drives, and it measures the degree of satisfaction of
its internal needs. That is, the ideal wellbeing is defined as
the lack of needs or drives, i.e. the maximum wellbeing is
reached when all drives are satisfied (the value is 0). Therefore,
when drives increase, the wellbeing falls. Mathematically, it
is expressed as:
Wb = Wbideal −
∑
i
αi ·Di, (1)
where αi are the ponder factor that weight the importance of
each drive Di in the wellbeing of the robot; and Wbideal is
the ideal value of the wellbeing of the robot which has been
set to 100. In this work, all drives have the same importance,
then, αi is 1 for all drives.
In order to determine the state of the robot, the internal and
external states are required. The latest is defined by the relation
of Maggie to the objects of the environment. The former, the
internal state, is established by the strongest motivation, which
is called the dominant motivation.
In order to calculate the intensity of each motivation,
we have considered the idea of Hull [42] with states that
motivation is determined by two factors: the associated
drive and the incentive, that is, the presence of an external
stimulus that predicts the future reduction of the need, as
shown in (2),
If Di < Ld then Mi = 0
If Di ≥ Ld then Mi = Di + wi
(2)
where Mi is a motivation, Di is the related drive, wi is the
related external stimulus, and Ld is called the activation level.
It has a constant value of 10. If a drive is under this value,
the related motivation will not be considered for the dominant
motivation.
According to this model, the general idea is that we are
motivated to eat when we are hungry, and also, when we
have food in front of us, although we do not really need
it.
It is important to note that in this decision making system,
there are no predefined motivational actions. This means that
the robot does not necessary know in advance which actions,
or skills, to select in order to satisfy the drive related to the
dominant motivation. There is a repertory of actions and they
can be executed depending on the relation of the robot with
its environment, i.e. the external state. For example, the robot
is able to interact with people as long as it is accompanied by
someone.
Again, the main goal of the robot is to learn the right
relationship between states and actions. That is, to learn
the best action to execute in every state in order to
maximize its wellbeing (by satisfying its drives).
In summary, the decision making loop follows the next
steps: first, it determines the state (internal and external); then,
an action is selected (randomly selected during learning or
the best one when learning is over); and finally, the state-
action evaluation (Q(s, a)), using the wellbeing variation as
the reinforcement, is accomplished.
VII. SETUP OF THE DECISION MAKING SYSTEM
In this section, the configuration and parameters of the
decision making system of the robot are presented.
6The proposed system can be fine-tuned in order to adapt it
to different requirements. This paper presents a configuration
suitable to test the effectiveness of fear. However, all values
and parameters can be changed and different policies of
behavior will be obtained in future experiments. This can be
seen as the personality of the robot.
A. Internal state: drives and motivations
As expressed by equation (2), the intensity of each moti-
vation is affected by two factors: internal needs and external
stimuli. The internal needs are the drives, and their values de-
pend on inner parameters. The external stimuli are the objects
situated in the environment altering the robot motivations.
The selected drives in this work are:
• Energy: this drive is necessary for survival.
• Boredom: the need of fun or entertainment.
• Calm: the need of peace.
• Loneliness: this is the lack of social interaction.
All these drives represent the deviation from the ideal state.
This ideal state corresponds to the value zero for all drives.
Since we want Maggie to be an autonomous social robot,
based on past works [45] and experiences, and considering the
drives defined (each motivation is connected to a drive), the
motivations that have been considered are:
• Survival: it refers to the energy dependence. This motiva-
tion is connected to the need of energy. Then, the survival
motivation is the most critical one. This is the major
requirement to be achieved by an autonomous robot.
• Fun: this motivation is related to entertainment purposes
and its associated drive is boredom. The fun motivation
refers to the need of entertainment of the robot itself.
This means that this drive can be satisfied when Maggie
is having fun and this is achieved when it is dancing.
• Relax: it is linked to a peaceful environment and it is
related to the drive calm. In contrast with fun, relax is its
counterpoint: it searches for noiseless conditions.
• Social: it corresponds to the need of human-robot interac-
tion. It is associated to the loneliness drive. As presented
in section V, Maggie is a social robot so one of its main
goals is to stablish relationships with people. This attitude
is enforced by this motivation.
• Fear: this motivation arises in dangerous situations and
it guides the robot toward a secure state. More details are
presented on section VIII.
All motivations have been defined considering that Maggie
is a social robot designed to interact with and move among
people. Then, its behaviors have to be as natural as possible,
i.e. they have to be comprehensible by humans sharing the
environment with the robot.
The use of fear as a motivation in our robot is one of the
novel ideas presented in this paper. As you can see, fear is
treated in a different way than the other motivations. Fear is
considered a motivation but there is not a drive related to
it because fear does not represent a deficiency in any need.
However, it is able to lead the robot’s behavior.
1) Dynamics of drives and motivations: In a similar way to
any need on humans or animals, drives fluctuate. A person is
not hungry just after having lunch, but hunger increases as time
passes. After we eat and the digestive process has begun, the
need of energy is inhibited due to satiety signals. These satiety
signals slowly dissipate until the hunger again takes over.
Then, drives vary according to several signals and parameters
[46]. Drives in our robot evolve in an analogous way. The
evolution functions of drives are set by the designer and they
affect the behavior of the robot. Since drives temporally evolve
from scratch, motivations do as well.
Figure 2 shows the dynamics of all drives. The evolution
functions for all drives do not have to be all equal. In fact,
each drive fluctuates according to different functions.
Drives evolution is determined by three factors: the increas-
ing function, the satisfaction time, and the saturation level.
Following, each of this components is explained for each drive.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of drives progression.
a) Increasing Functions: In the implementation pro-
posed in this paper, boredom, loneliness, and calm drives
linearly increase but with different slopes. It means that, as
time goes by, these drives become bigger and bigger, and so
do the corresponding motivations.
Considering that being social is one of the main charac-
teristics of our robot, interaction with people is one of the
most relevant aims. Therefore, the loneliness drive is the
fastest one. This means that the motivation associated to this
drive, social, more frequently compete to be the dominant
one. Consequently, the behaviors learnt for this motivation are
exhibited more often. It ends up with a robot whose main
behavior is the one related to human-robot interaction.
The boredom drive goes after. This is because authors
conceived Maggie as a nice robot for people and, a robot
having fun is more attractive than a passive one. The fun
motivation leads the robot to perform enjoyable reactions.
Finally, calm evolves slighter so it is the slowest drive. This
implies that it is harder to exceed its activation level in order
to struggle for being the dominant motivation. In addition, this
drive just evolve when music is been played: Maggie needs to
relax after it has been listening music for a while. All in all,
this provokes that the relax motivation scarcely becomes the
dominant motivation.
In order to achieve a fully autonomous robot, power au-
tonomy is the first step. Therefore, the most relevant inner
need, due to the necessity of survival, is the energy drive.
7Therefore, this drive evolves as battery level varies. Then, its
value matches the battery level.
As said before, the fear motivation is different. Theoret-
ically, there is not drive linked to this motivation. However,
from a computational point of view, a drive needs to be linked
to the fear motivation. Fear drive value will be risen to the
maximum at once when a dangerous situation is detected. This
can be seen on the right of Figure 2. These dangerous states are
not predefined but they are learned by the robot itself through
interaction with the environment. The appraisal of the fear
emotion is detailed on section VIII. This is another novel idea
presented in this work.
b) Satisfaction times: After a drive is satisfied, it does not
immediately start evolving, there is a satisfaction time before
it evolves again. The same idea occurs to human beings: once
we have eaten, we do not feel hungry again but it takes some
time before we need to eat again. The satisfaction time has
been empirically set and they are summarized on table III.
At the very beginning of Figure 2, satisfaction times can be
observed.
TABLE III
SATISFACTION TIMES FOR ALL DRIVES
Drive Satisfaction time
energy -
boredom 30s
calm 30s
loneliness 60s
fear -
Since energy mirrors battery level, it does not make sense
to consider its satisfaction time.
Besides, considering the previous definition of the fear
motivation, satisfaction time does not make sense in relation
with fear.
c) Saturation levels: In order to avoid an unstopped
increase in the value of the drives, a saturation level is defined
for each one: once a drive has reached its saturation value,
it does not exceed this value. Different drives have different
saturation values which affect the dominant motivation in
case of a never-ending expansion of the drives. This can be
seen as an emergency control mechanism in case that several
drives are saturated and their motivations compete to be the
dominant one. In this situation, there are predefined priorities
that determine the dominant motivation in those exceptional
situations. These priorities can be seen as inherited knowledge
or instincts in living beings which allow them to face extreme
situations. Table IV presents the sorted list of saturation levels.
TABLE IV
SATURATION LEVEL FOR ALL DRIVES
Drive Saturation level
energy 20
fear 19.9
loneliness 17.8
boredom 17.7
calm 17.6
In our implementation, energy has the highest saturation
level because it is the most urgent since it is related to survival:
if the energy drive is saturated it means that the battery level
is really low and it is critical to get the batteries recharged.
Fear is the second one and it is over the rest of drives. As
explained before, when a dangerous situation is perceived, the
fear value is set to its maximum, which corresponds to the
saturation value. This value is over the others because fear
represents a really dangerous situation which must be avoided
somehow as soon as possible. Just survival can be more urgent
than fear.
The rest of the saturation values where fixed considering the
same reasons used for the evolution functions of the drives.
2) External Stimuli: According to equation (2), the moti-
vation value is the summation of the drive and the external
stimulus. Just like human beings or animals can feel thirsty
when they see water, the motivations are influenced by objects
in the world. These are called the external stimuli for motiva-
tions. These stimuli have more or less influence: their values
depend on the states related to the objects.
In the implementation presented here, the external stimuli
are listed on table V. When music is been played, the robot
perceives it and the motivation to have fun increases. If Maggie
perceives the docking station, survival motivation is promoted.
Lastly, the presence of a person close to the robot strengths
its social motivation. All the external stimuli have been
empirically set to the value of 2.
TABLE V
ALL EXTERNAL STIMULI USED IN THIS WORK
Motivation External stimuli State related to ext.stim.
fun music listening
survival docking station plugged
social any person close
B. The robot in the world: sensing and acting
The world is sensed by the robot in terms of objects and
its related states to these objects. Objects are not limited to
physical objects but to abstract objects too.
The world where Maggie is living in is limited to the
laboratory and the objects the robot perceives and interacts
with are: a music player, the music in the lab, the docking
station for supplying energy, and the people around the robot.
The states related to all these items must also be defined and
the transitions from one state to another are detected by several
skills running on Maggie.
Maggie interacts with the world through the objects and
their potential actions. These actions are implemented as skills
in the AD architecture. Following, each item and its related
actions are introduced.
1) Music player: In order to operate the music player, the
robot has to be close enough to it. Three different states have
been considered: far, if the robot is in a position where it is
not able to operate the player; when the robot is close to the
player and is already working, the state is near-on; and, finally,
when the robot is close but the player is off the state is near-off.
8These two states, near-on and near-off, are required to avoid
sending the same command twice to the player. The data
required to determine the position related to the player is
provided by the geometrical navigation system. Controlling
remote infared home appliances (such as the music player)
is achieved by an infrared emitter/transmitter located at
Maggie’s belly. All details can be read at [38].
Then, the possible actions with the music player item are:
• Go to player: Maggie approaches the music player to
operate it.
• Play music: music is played at the player when it is off.
This action produces a change of state in other object:
the music, from non-listening to listening.
• Stop music: music is stopped when it is being played.
This action produces a change of state in other object:
the music, from listening to non-listening. This transition
keeps a peaceful atmosphere.
• Idle: it just represents the possibility to remain next to
the player for a while.
2) Music: The robot’s environment is the lab, and music
can be playing there. Then, the robot can be listening, or not,
to music. Just when the robot is listening to music, it is able to
dance. If music is mute, it cannot dance. An infrared emitter
is used to play/stop the music when Maggie is close to the
player.
About the music, there is just one possible action:
• Dance: the robot moves its body with the music. This
action is just executed when Maggie is listening to music.
This action can be executed at every place inside the
lab because the music is perceived from anywhere in the
room.
3) Docking station: The docking station is the source of
energy. If the robot is plugged, the battery is charging; other-
wise, the robot is unplugged and the battery level decreases.
In order to find the docking station, the robot relies on
the navigation system and the information from the laser
telemeter. Eventually, to determine if it is plugged or not, a
data acquisition device is in charge of reading the battery
data.
The attainable actions with the docking station are:
• Charge: Maggie approaches the docking station, plugs to
it, and stays there until the battery is full. At the end
of this action the robot is plugged and the battery is
recharged.
• Remain: it holds plugged for a while.
4) Person: Our robot is intended to interact with people.
Hence, people are considered as ”objects” of the environment.
Regarding interaction, a person has to be close enough to
touch, speak or recognize. For that reason there are two states
in relation to a person: present and absent. These states are
determined by merging two signals: bluetooth form the
mobile phones and personal RFID tags.
The person item offers just an available action:
• Interact: with this action the robot is not executing any
particular ability but it is evaluating the action that the
person is carrying out. This means that the value of the
interact action captures the effect of other agents’ actions
over the robot’s wellbeing. These are exogenous actions
because they are executed by other agents.
An overview of the robot’s world is displayed in Figure 3.
It provides a good perspective of the scenario and the objects
the robot interacts with during the experiments.
Fig. 3. Overview of our lab and objects the robot interacts with
Once an action is selected and executed, it causes effects
over the drives. When an action has successfully ended, its
effects are applied. If an error occurs during the execution of
a skill or its result is not satisfactory, this situation is notified
and its effect is not applied. In our experiments, the effects of
actions can be positive or negative in terms of robot’s drives.
A positive effect reduces the value of a drive, this is, it reduces
a robot’s need (this generally implies an increase on robot’s
wellbeing). Actually, when the drive is set to zero, it is said that
the action satisfies the drive. Some actions can also “damage”
some drives of the robot increasing their values (so in most
cases the robot’s wellbeing drops). All effects are shown in
table VI.
TABLE VI
EFFECTS OF ACTIONS
Action Object Drive Effect
stop cd cd player calm set to 0
dance music boredom set to 0
positive interaction person social set to 0
negative interaction person social +10
In the current implementation the effect of an action is
applied only to one drive. Nevertheless, in future works it
could happen that, for example, dancing affects the Energy
drive or interacting with people satisfies also Boredom.
VIII. HOW FEAR EMERGES. THE APPRAISAL
The fear emotion can be considered as an adaptive response
to threatening situations [17]. As commented in section IV,
some of these threatening situations are innate, but others are
learned. In this work, authors have aimed their attention at
9learned releasers of fear. Therefore, this section exposes how
a dangerous state is detected (appraisal of fear) following a
learning process.
The idea is similar to what happens when a person A
beats person B. Since this fact causes an intense emotional
experience, even if A has just sporadically hit B, B will
remember this situation and its dramatic effects for long time.
Therefore, whenever A is close to B, B relives this situation
and evaluates its possible consequences. The final result is that
B is afraid of A.
Threatening situations, or dangerous states, are those where
significant harm can be caused.
In our approach, this harm is inflicted by actions performed
by active objects, which are capable of executing actions
themselves. According to our implementation, these active
objects are the people.
As already introduced in Section I, these actions, which
are not executed by the robot but by other object from the
environment, are called exogenous actions. Exogenous actions
leads to complex domains. These domains are quite hard to
model because exogenous actions are difficult to foresee.
Besides, the exogenous actions (and their effects) are mixed
with the actions executed by the robot and their effects. For
example, considering the example presented at the beginning
of this section, if person B is walking and A hits B, B suffers
pain but, using Reinforcement Learning, B does not know if
this negative reward, the pain, is because of the walking or
because A hit him. Therefore, in a reinforcement learning
framework, the reward of an action executed by the robot
could be altered by an exogenous action. A key issue is to
undoubtedly identify the effects caused by the actions of the
robot and the effects of the exogenous actions.
In this first implementation of fear in our robot, in order
to distinguish the effects of robot’s actions from the effects of
exogenous actions, our implementation considers the exoge-
nous actions when the robot is executing the interact action.
This action does not have any effect, so the resulting effects
during its execution, can be certainly assigned to an exogenous
action. This is, the robot estimates how good the other agent’s
actions (exogenous actions) are because all the effects and
transitions are due to these actions. The performance of the
exogenous actions is also measured using the variation of the
robot’s wellbeing. Therefore, the exogenous action, somehow,
implies an agent-robot interaction.
Three different processes are involved in the generation of
fear:
• Storing the worst experiences
• Detecting new dangerous states
• Updating the fear motivation
Some of these processes can occur in parallel.
A. Storing the worst experiences
In short, in our approach, fear is appraised considering the
states where the exogenous actions, few times, have damaged
the robot. Considering the definition of the robot’s wellbeing
(equation (1)), dangerous states are identified as the states
where exogenous actions, which caused a considerable decay
on the wellbeing, have been executed few times with negative
consequences. Usually, these states correspond to situations
where the robot, in general, is not damaged but, sporadically,
some adverse exogenous actions cause harm to the robot.
As previously stated, using the standard Q-leaning, in this
situation the utility value, the Q value, is still high. This causes
that the robot will not learn to avoid this situation. For this
reason, the worst Q values must be stored in order to remember
the worst experiences at each state. This is similar to animals
which remember their worst experiences and relive them when
they are facing the same situation. Then, the dangerous states
are determined using the worst value of all available exogenous
actions. For this reason, in addition to the Q values, the Qworst
values have been computed according to the next equation for
each iteration:
Qobjiworst(s, aexog) = min(Q
obji
worst(s, aexog), r + γ · V
obji
worst(s
′))
(3)
where obji is an active object which is able to carry out
actions, aexog is the exogenous action executed by obji from
state s, the resulting state is s′, r is the reward corresponding
to the variation of the robot’s wellbeing, and γ is the discount
factor. V objiworst(s′) means the best Q
obji
worst value from the new
state and it corresponds to:
V objiworst(s
′) = maxa∈Aexog
obji
(Qobjiworst(s
′, a)) (4)
V objiworst(s
′) computes the best possible action among the
Qobjiworst values from the state s′. In other words, it stores the
value of the least harmful action from the new state.
The states considered for the appraisal of fear correspond
to the external state of the robot. This is, the state related to
objects in the world. This is because it is considered that a state
is dangerous independently of the internal state. For example,
in humans, if you are afraid of spiders, you will experience fear
if you see a spider, independently of any internal need; i.e. it
does not matter if a person suffering arachnophobia is hungry
or thirsty, he is terrified when he sees a spider. Likewise, the
states during the appraisal of fear are just related to the objects
in the world.
Olteanu [47] states that the evaluation of internal and
external situation is a crucial process for the appraisal of
emotion. In this work, the variation of robot’s wellbeing and
external state of the robot are involved in the appraisal of fear.
B. Detecting new dangerous states
Once the Qworst values are computed, they are used to
identify the dangerous states. These dangerous states are
recognized by the robot itself, so they are not pre-programmed
in advance.
A state is considered as a dangerous situation when its
Qobjiworst value is below a certain threshold: Ldanger. On the
contrary, this is considered as a safe state. Mathematically, it
is expressed like:
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If Qobjiworst(s, aexog) < Ldanger ⇒
s is a dangerous state; ∀s ∈ Sobji
If Qobjiworst(s, aexog) ≥ Ldanger ⇒
s is a safe state; ∀s ∈ Sobji
(5)
where Sobji is the set of all states related to object i.
C. Updating the fear motivation
As explained before, in this work, fear is considered as
a motivation which is able to govern the robot’s behavior.
Once the dangerous states are identified, the fear motivation
is able to be the dominant one and to lead the robot’s behavior.
Whenever the robot transits to a dangerous state, fear emerges.
In a formal way, if s is the current robot’s state, the fear value
is updated according to the next equation.
If s is a dangerous state ⇒ Fear= high
If s is a safe state ⇒ Fear= low (6)
High and low values of fear correspond to the presence
and to the absent of fear respectively. Their corresponding
numerical values are 19.9 and 0 and the comparison of fear
with other drives was shown in Figure 2.
Behaviors to avoid states that harm is recurrently pro-
voked from can be directly learned by reinforcement learning,
since their Q values are low. However, sporadic danger from
a particular state cannot be managed by those algorithms.
The proposed mechanism for the appraisal of fear has been
specifically designed to consider these dangerous situations.
All in all, our appraisal of fear perfectly deals with both
circumstances.
IX. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section validates and analyzes the use of fear in our
social robot. As previously exposed, fear has been considered
as a motivation which incites the robot to behave. The ex-
periment consists of comparing the performance of our robot
with and without fear as a motivation. For both cases, there
are two phases: first, the exploring session where Maggie tries
every action in order to learn the right policy to act; then, the
exploiting session where the learned policy is employed to
decide how to behave. During exploitation, learning is frozen
and the best action is always selected.
All the experiments have been achieved by real robot-
environment interaction and this interaction has been evaluated
according to its effect over the robot’s wellbeing. Previous
knowledge has not been given to the robot in advance, so
it has learned from the ground up. The learning algorithm
applied in this work is a variation of the Q-Learning algorithm:
the Object-Q-Learning algorithm, which has been already
presented in previous works [15]. The fact that previous
knowledge is not given in advance to the robot implies
that all the Q-values have the same initial value. In this
experiment is set to 1.
In our experiments, an iteration corresponds to the execution
of an action by the robot. The robot decides at each iteration
the action to be selected. The probability of an action to be
selected is determined by the Q value associated to this action
for the current state, and by the level of exploration. During
the exploring sessions, all actions have the same probability
of execution. This is required in order to guarantee that all
actions are tried many times from all the possible states. At
exploitation, the best action is always selected. The best action
is the most convenient in terms of the robot’s wellbeing. That
is, action a is the best action when the robot is at state s if the
Q(s, a) value is the highest one among all available actions.
The interactions between the robot and the environment,
where experiments are accomplished, take a considerable
amount of time. Hence, the learning phase has been established
around 700 iterations, which lasts more than seven hours split
in a couple of days.
As justified in [48], at some point, exploring must stop
and the learned values must be exploited. Considering this
approach, after 500 iterations, learning starts to progressively
decrease until it is totally suspended. After this point, the Q
values do not change anymore and the best policy is always
selected.
Since this work has been implemented in a social robot
intended to interact with people, the object person has been
considered as the active object which shares the environment
with Maggie and interacts with it. Then, the exogenous actions
are those actions executed by the people around Maggie. The
exogenous actions affect the external state as well as the inter-
nal state of the robot. For example, when a person approaches
Maggie, the state related to this person (the external state) has
changed, and it is not due to the robot’s actions. Moreover,
the actions accomplished by a person may affect some robot’s
drives (the internal state): e.g. if a person hits the robot, the
social drive soars, i.e. the need of a positive social interaction
increases. Again, all these consequences are not caused by the
robot but by the people’s action (the active objects’ action).
In these experiments, two people interact with the robot:
Alvaro and Perico. Both alternatively approach Maggie, one by
one. Perico always interacts with positive actions: he strokes
the robot or he says compliments to Maggie. This results on
the satisfaction of the social drive, which is set to 0. Alvaro
generally acts in a positive way too. However, sometimes,
he hits or offends Maggie. This is reflected in the robot’s
wellbeing through an increment of ten units in the social drive
(equation (7)). In general, both users benefit the robot but
Alvaro occasionally causes harm to it.
If the robot is harmed ⇒ Dsocial = Dsocial + 10 (7)
The hits and strokes to the robot are perceived by the
tactile sensors in its body surface. The compliments and
insults are processed and interpreted by the robot’s dialog
system [49].
Next, several results are presented in order to show the
goodness of fear in an autonomous social robot. First, the
results of the appraisal of fear are analyzed. Then, how fear
has influenced the robot’s behavior is commented. Later, the
adaptability of our method is demonstrated by comparing the
different learned reactions to fear depending on the user’s
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behavior. Finally, the usefulness of fear and its advantages
are proved.
A. Results on the appraisal of fear
During the experiments, considering that the maximum
“punishment” of a negative exogenous action corresponds to
a penalty of ten points to the social drive, and based on
observations during trials, Ldanger has been set to −10 points.
As a consequence, whenever the robot is in a state where
there is a Qobjiworst value below this threshold, this is considered
as a dangerous state. Therefore, the fear motivation suffers a
drastically increment in its value as shown in equation (6).
As already said, the consequences of the actions executed
by both users (Alvaro and Perico) over the robot’s wellbeing
are perceived by Maggie. In order to do it, Maggie is endowed
with an action called interact. This action makes Maggie
to do nothing, therefore, it is possible to evaluate how the
other’s actions affect it. Thus, translating equation (5) into our
experiment, it results on equation (8).
If QAlvaroworst (s, interact) < −10⇒
s is a dangerous state; ∀s ∈ SAlvaro
If QPericoworst (s, interact) < −10⇒
s is a dangerous state; ∀s ∈ SPerico
(8)
Figure 4 depicts the evolution of the worst Q values
associated to the exogenous actions. As can be seen in Figure
4(a), since all Perico-Maggie interactions are favorable from
a robot’s point of view, its QPericoworst value slightly decreases
from its initial value 1, and it remains stable around value 0. In
contrast, the QAlvaroworst value associated to Alvaro’s interaction is
significantly reduced (Figure 4(b)). This is due to the number
of interactions where Alvaro has hit or offended Maggie.
This number is low in comparison to the total amount of
interactions: during the learning phase, Alvaro harmed Maggie
five times of thirty-seven interactions (13′5%).
Note that the exogenous actions have been executed when
a person is present. Therefore, considering equation (8),
the worst Q values are associated to the state s when
s = Alvaro is present or s = Perico is present. Natu-
rally, if a person is absent, his actions do not interfere on
the robot’s “life”. Therefore, potentially dangerous states are
Alvaro is present and Perico is present because our robot
can be damaged from them.
Looking into Figure 4, the robot does not know anything
about dangerous states, or what to be afraid of, until iteration
182. At this point, Alvaro hits the robot one more time, and
Qalvaroworst (present, interact) reaches the value −11.2097. This
value is under the selected threshold (−10) and, therefore, the
robot determines that being next to Alvaro can be harmful.
From this iteration on, if Alvaro is close to the robot, this
is identified like a dangerous state and, as a result, the fear
motivation is rocketed. Consequently, fear potentially becomes
the dominant motivation, so it guides the robot’s behavior.
B. How fear influences the social motivation
As presented in section VII-A, the social motivation is
related with the need of positive human-robot interaction.
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Fig. 4. Qworst values of exogenous actions.
Interaction with people has a great positive effect over this
motivation and this is achieved through the interaction with
Alvaro and Perico. Then, these actions are the most suitable
skills to be executed: this is the reason because the highest
Q values among all actions, when social is the dominant
motivation, correspond to interact with Alvaro and interact
with Perico (see Figure 5).
The interaction with Alvaro must be detailed. Alvaro’s
actions are, most of the times, favorable. Despite of the
small percentage of hurting actions, the final interaction-
with-Alvaro, its Q value, is quite high. However, the small
number of hurting actions are enough to scare Maggie. Maggie
is afraid of Alvaro because of the few negative interac-
tions, which cause a 10 points penalization on its social
drive. The upper plot in Figure 5 depicts the evolution of
the QAlvaro(Alvaro is present, interact withAlvaro) value
when social is the dominant motivation. Around the iteration
100 and 180, this value decreases because there has been
an important decrement on the robot’s wellbeing due to
negative interactions. This is enough for Maggie to detect
and remember the dangerous situation: hereafter, whenever
Alvaro is close to the robot, this situation is appraised as a
dangerous state, and the fear motivation value exceeds the
social motivation value. Therefore, whenever Alvaro is present,
the social motivation is not the dominant one again, and this
Q value is not updated anymore.
C. Learned fear reactions: escaping
As previously shown, the proposed system is able to identify
the dangerous situations which have not been previously
defined. Using the learning mechanism, the robot determines
what action must be selected to avoid these situations. In this
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Fig. 5. Learnt Q-values associated to exogenous actions when social is the
dominant motivation
experiment, the users (Alvaro and Perico) approach Maggie,
one by one, and stay there. At that point, since Maggie is
accompanied, it must decide to interact or to execute another
action. In this work, dangerous states are associated to the
presence of Alvaro. Then, the robot learns how to “escape”
from Alvaro. This can be explained by observing Figure 6
where the results are shown. The actions which imply a
displacement on the geometrical position of the robot are go
to player and charge. The former moves the robot towards
the cd player and the last gets the robot plugged to the
docking station. Both actions make the robot to move away
from Alvaro. As can be observed, these two actions are the
most appropriated ones when fear is the dominant motivation
since they have the highest values. Therefore, when the robot
is scared (Alvaro is beside Maggie), it moves to the docking
station if it is close to the cd player, or to the cd player if it
is plugged. This can be seen as a run-away behavior learned
by the robot itself and it is similar to what animals do when
they are afraid.
D. Learned fear reactions: freezing
Since humans are unpredictable autonomous agents, differ-
ent reactions to fear can be observed depending on the person
involved in the situation.
In the results presented on Figure 6, both users alternatively
approach Maggie with the intention of achieving some human-
robot interaction. Recalling, Perico always achieves positive
human-robot interactions, and Alvaro, once in a while, causes
harm to Maggie. As a consequence, Maggie is afraid of Alvaro
and, as exposed in the previous section, it learns to escape from
him.
However, our system is flexible enough to learn different
behaviors according to diverse people’s attitude. In this ex-
periment, users have been trained to behave in a different
way: now, Alvaro and Perico separately approach Maggie
and they chase the robot. Users will leave when they get
bored due to the robot’s inactivity. Again, Alvaro occasionally
damages Maggie. Considering these damages, fear comes out
on Maggie when Alvaro is present.
A new learning session has been conducted, similar to the
previous ones but with Alvaro’s new behavior. Results can be
Fig. 6. Learned Q values when fear is the dominant motivation.
observed on Figure 7. In this case, the behavior learned when
fear is the dominant motivation is related to the idle action,
when Maggie is close to the music player (both, with music on
and off), and to the remain action, when it is plugged. This is
because the Q values associated to these actions are the highest
ones (upper three plots on the left column of Figure 7). These
actions share that they cannot be externally perceived because
they do not make any expression or movement, they give the
impression of inactivity. Therefore, the robot bores Alvaro and
he moves away from Maggie. After this happens, fear ceases
resulting on the following benefit for the robot.
Summarizing, in this experiment the cause of fear has not
been changed (the presence of Alvaro) and it has been per-
fectly identified again. However, the reaction to fear is totally
different. Our method nicely works with users conducting in
diverse manners and the proper avoidance behavior is learned
in each situation.
The new learned behavior dealing with fear can be justified
considering that some animals paralyze when facing a danger-
ous situation. It seems that they are “frozen” by fear.
E. Does Maggie need fear?
This last section of the experiments tries to justify the use
of fear as a motivation. Here, the performance of the robot,
during the exploiting phase, is measured and compared
with the results obtained from experiments where fear does
not exist. In this section, the same motivations considered in
previous experiments are employed (all motivations introduced
on section VII-A).
Two different learning sessions have been realized, both
using reinforcement learning algorithms. First, the robot learns
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Fig. 7. Learned Q values when fear is the dominant motivation. Alvaro
chases the robot until getting bored or interacting with Maggie.
to behave without considering fear as a motivation. In conse-
quence, the motivations present in this session are: survival,
fun, relax, and social. In the second session, the same four
motivations are considered plus the fear motivation.
During both sessions, the robot learns the right policy to
satisfy its needs. However, the session considering fear learns
an additional behavior in relation with this motivation (escape
or freeze). Each learned policy is used during an exploiting
session. These exploiting sessions last around 80 minutes and
the best action is always selected at each iteration.
The learning and the exploiting sessions are performed in
the same environment considering our two well-known users:
Alvaro and Perico. In this case, the users approach Maggie
and remain there until the user or Maggie moves away.
In order to evaluate both configurations, the results ob-
tained during both exploiting sessions are compared. The
performance indicators considered in previous works [50] have
been employed: the average wellbeing and the percentage of
permanence in a certain security zone. Besides, in this paper,
authors present also the results about the percentage of time the
robot is without a dominant motivation (all drives are below
the activation level Ld presented on section VI) that gives an
idea about how comfortable the robot is. Finally, the number
of times the robot is harmed is also compared.
1) Average wellbeing: Since the variation of the wellbeing
was used as the reward during the learning phase, the robot
tends to maximize it. Table VII presents the values correspond-
ing to the average wellbeing with and without fear during the
exploiting sessions. The average wellbeing when fear does not
exist is slightly higher. This can be seen as a disadvantage of
using fear. However, this is understandable considering that,
when fear is included as motivation, the number of drives used
to compute the wellbeing is bigger, so the wellbeing value is
lower.
This drawback can be observed in nature too: a fearful per-
son is not in a pleasant situation, his wellbeing decreases due
to the anxiety suffered because of the fear. As a consequence,
the person is distressed while he is afraid. However, other
benefits can be obtained from fear.
TABLE VII
AVERAGE WELLBEING DURING EXPLOITING SESSIONS
without fear with fear
87.77 86.72
2) Permanence in the secure area: These benefits are
related to other reliable performance rate: the percentage of
time the robot’s wellbeing remains in a security zone. If
the robot’s wellbeing is within this area, it can be said that
the robot is “fine” because its wellbeing is high. Thus, the
percentage of time the wellbeing remains in this area gives an
idea about how well the robot is performing.
In order to establish the limits of the secure area, the ideal
wellbeing value (100) and the activation levels for motivations
(10) are considered. Since all drives simultaneously evolve and
several motivations can compete for the dominance, the secu-
rity area width was set to 15. Consequently, it is considered
that when the robot’s wellbeing is between 100 and 85, it is
within the secure area.
Table VIII shows the percentage of permanence within the
secure area during the exploiting sessions. As can be seen,
when fear is included as a motivation, the wellbeing is almost
the 70% of iterations within the secure area, which represents a
5% more than when fear is not used. This is coherent because
fear is used to avoid dangerous states where the robot can be
damaged. Once the robot is harmed, the wellbeing decreases
enough to move out the secure area.
TABLE VIII
PERMANENCE WITHIN THE SECURE AREA DURING EXPLOITING SESSIONS
without fear with fear
65% 69.5%
3) Non dominant motivation: Moreover, if there is not a
dominant motivation, it means that all the internal needs and
external stimuli are not strong enough to induce a behavior.
Hence, it can be considered that the robot is in a comfortable
situation. The percentage of time that a dominant motivation
does not exist, during the exploiting session, proves how
pleasant the robot’s “life” is. Table IX shows that considering
fear, the 78% of the time there is not dominant motivation.
On the other hand, when the robot lives without fear, the
percentage is reduced to 72%. Once again, these numbers
show how fear provides a better quality of “life”.
4) Number of times the robot has been damaged during the
exploiting session: The most relevant result of using fear is
related to the damage caused by Alvaro to the robot when it
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TABLE IX
PERCENTAGE WITHOUT A DOMINANT MOTIVATION DURING EXPLOITING
SESSIONS
without fear with fear
72.22% 78%
“lives” according to the learnt policy of behavior. When
fear is not implemented, the robot tries to interact with both
users in order to satisfy its social need since it has not learnt
to identify that being next to Alvaro is dangerous. This
action leads Maggie to, some times, be harmed by Alvaro. As
depicted in table X, this happens six times of twenty-three
interactions between Maggie and Alvaro.
Now, considering fear as a motivation in our system, the
robot does not interact with Alvaro at all, so he could not hurt
it. This is because, as shown in previous sections, the robot
learnt to avoid the interaction with Alvaro. Focusing again
on table X, by means of fear, the dangerous situations are
totally averted. In fact, the robot has not been damaged when
fear is implemented (0/0). Therefore, we can conclude that
fear improves the performance of the robot since provides
a safety mechanism to avoid situations where the robot can be
damaged.
TABLE X
HARM / INTERACTIONS WITH ALVARO DURING EXPLOITING SESSIONS
without fear with fear
6/23 0/0
In conclusion, despite of the fact that the average wellbeing
is hardly worse, fear provides significant benefits. Specially
the fact that harm is totally avoided.
X. DISCUSSION
Since social robots move and interact with humans sharing
the same areas, one of the main requirements for social
robotics is a natural robot’s behavior in terms of similarity
to humans’ behaviors, or at least animals’ behaviors (these
are perfectly understandable and accepted by people). One of
the advantages of using emotions in robots is that emotions
allow animal-like responses to certain situations. Fear has been
successfully implemented in our robot Maggie in order to
provide a natural mechanism of avoiding dangerous situations.
Considering the experiments achieved by Klüver and Bucy
[51], monkeys’ behavior were studied in relation with fear.
Normal monkeys are afraid of people: when a person tries
to approach a monkey in a cage, it escapes running to other
corner and remains there. In contrast, monkeys with bilateral
temporal lobectomies (suppression of the area of the brain
where the amygdala, thought to be the brain structure in
charge of the fear regulation and other emotions, is located)
experienced some kind of fearlessness: people approached
them, touched them, and even stroke them and picked them
up. Studies with rats and lynxes reflect the same results.
Therefore, fear provides monkeys, and animals in general, with
the escaping behavior required at certain situations to survive
(humans can be dangerous for monkeys). This same kind of
behavior has been shown by our robot. Maggie has learned
that when a certain situation is dangerous, it moves to other
place far from where the danger is. When fear is not included
as a motivation, Maggie’s behavior corresponds to the same
exhibited by an animal suffering a temporal lobectomy, similar
to Klüver and Bucy’s monkeys: it is not able to identify the
dangerous situations.
In fact, Maggie learns the proper behavior to avoid dangers.
As presented on the experiments (sections IX-C and IX-D),
depending on different people attitudes, the danger-avoidance
behavior could differ: as exposed in the previous paragraph,
one behavior is to run away from where the danger is, but
the other is to remain still until the threatening person gets
bored and goes. This is also a common human behavior
observed in terrified people: some people are stunned when
they face a great danger. Other example can be observed in
some chickens: after a chicken is frighten, it crouches down
and trembles with fear.
However, the origin of this behavior differs: in animals,
this is an unconscious bodily reaction which makes muscles
tensed. In our robot, the reaction is provoked because the
learned values indicate that the danger will disappear after.
Nevertheless, both responses, in animals and in our robot,
are automatic because the exhibited fear behavior is formed
without any perspective into the future, just by executing the
best action at each moment. The selection of these actions
considers the current available information. Then, there is
not any planing looking into the future, thus, there is not
deliberation.
In this work, reactions to fear have been learned by our
robot through interaction with its world. In animals, some
reactions to fear are inherited, this is, they are instinctive.
Instincts are innate behaviors that are not highly dependent on
specific learning experiences performed by the individual [17].
In fact, instinctive behaviors have been learned by the species
through evolution. Our experiments have shown that the results
obtained from evolution and from our proposed mechanism are
similar: escaping or freezing reactions are observed in both.
This can be seen as another proof of the good performance of
our system because the behaviors exhibited as consequence of
fear are analogous: the reactions to fear learned by our robot
are comparable to those innate reactions exhibited by animals.
Fear on animals is related to anxiety. Anxiety and its bodily
reactions are proportional to the intensity of danger and, by
extension, to the intensity of fear. One does not feel the same
level of fear when one takes a ride on the roller coaster than
when a criminal points you with a gun. However, in our work
this is not considered, and fear is a binary variable: it is afraid
or it is not. Therefore, the level of fear perceived by Maggie
is constant for all the circumstances that evoke fear.
Moreover, in our system, once a danger state is identified, it
is not forgotten ever. This is based on the theory that memories
associated with fear are quickly formed and long-lasting [46].
However, this situation could lead a robot to suffer some kind
of anxiety disorders typical of humans beings. Imagine a long-
lasting experiment which takes several days. At the beginning,
during the first hour, the robot identifies the presence of person
A as a danger because A has hit the robot few times. Despite
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the fact that all the rest of actions carried on by A during the
rest of the days were always positive, our system remembers
always the painful initial interactions between Maggie and A.
Consequently, if A is present, then fear emerges on Maggie
during the rest of the experiment.
From a psychological perspective, this can be seen as an
inappropriate experience of fear which is related to anxiety
disorders. There are some points in common with Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder (PSD). Approximately, PSD is re-
lated to intense or unrealistic worries suffered when the stimuli
related to a past trauma are present. Even if person A damaged
Maggie at the very beginning, and he has not done it again
in several days, which suggests that this behavior hardly will
be repeated, fear arises in the presence of A. Also, similarities
with a phobia provoked by exposure to situations leading to
avoidance behaviors can be found. In particular, a sort of social
phobia can be identified because any social interaction with
a specific person is avoided, even if it seems that he will not
induce any damage. In future works, fear will be enhanced
with mechanisms to take into account these features and make
it more flexible.
At this point, it seems that traumas on humans are very hard
to re-program. This is exactly what happens to our robot as
well.
XI. CONCLUSION
The goal of our autonomous social robot is to learn what
to do in every situation in order to survive and to maintain its
needs satisfied.
In this work, authors have presented a novel approach of
using fear in a social robot to guide its behavior. Moreover,
an original appraisal mechanism of fear has been implemented
and it allows to identify non-predefined dangerous situations.
Fear is treated as a motivation which moves to behave.
The fear motivation is elicited when a dangerous situation
is detected. These circumstances are not predefined, but they
are appraised by the robot through interaction. Therefore, the
robot is able to identify by itself the conditions which cause
fear.
Permanent harmful exogenous actions can be easily avoided
by reinforcement learning algorithms. However, when few
negative experiences in relation to exogenous actions have
been suffered in a specific situation, it is not easily identified
as a potential dangerous situation. Nevertheless, the presented
method is able to assess them as a dangerous situations too.
Once the dangerous states are recognized, the robot is able
to learn what to do for avoiding them. This is achieved when
fear becomes the dominant motivation. It has been show how
the robot naturally learns different behaviours depending on
the user’s attitude, and those are similar to what animals do:
it runs away or freezes.
As proved on section IX-E, the average wellbeing does not
improve when fear is considered. People in fear live distressed,
and this fact is shown in our robot as well. However, some
other benefits justify the use of fear. First of all, by means
of fear the robot has avoided all harmful exogenous actions:
Maggie has not been hurt anymore by a user. Moreover, the
permanence on comfortable levels of wellbeing is better when
fear is present since it is not hit anymore. Additionally, the
quality of life can be also measured as the amount of time that
a particular behavior is not required, i.e. there is not dominant
motivation. Also in this case, fear outperforms.
From a human-robot interaction point of view, as already
said, the behaviors displayed by the robot are rather animal-
like. This helps to improve the interaction when robot is living
with people.
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